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Deployment of Supply Chain Security Practices: Antecedents and Consequences 
1. Introduction 
“The United States and nations around the world depend upon the efficient and secure transit of 
goods through the global supply chain system…As a nation, we must address the challenges posed by these 
[supply chain security] threats and strengthen our national and international policies accordingly (National 
Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security, 2012).” 
 
Breaches in supply chain security (SCS) have the potential to inflict hardship on firms and the welfare 
of people and society at large (Sheffi, 2005). For instance, cargo theft occurs on a daily basis in the U.S. and 
bears at least $35 billion in annual losses to companies alone (U.S. News, 2012). In 2010, a gang of thieves 
made off with around $60 million of pharmaceuticals (https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/pharmaceutical-theft) 
from an Eli Lilly warehouse and cost the company about 75 million including goodwill costs (ABC News, 
2010). Further investigation by FBI revealed that the same group was responsible for four other significant 
heists totaling over 30 million. Smuggling of people, weapons, and illegal substances via global supply chains 
has also been a constant and worrisome affair to firms and nations alike (Rice and Spayd, 2005). BBC (2014) 
reports that drug smugglers used a food supply chain to smuggle a large quantity of cocaine from Colombia 
to Germany; the shipment of cocaine made it to five branches of ALDI-Nord in and around Berlin, the German 
capital. Adulteration of products is also a current issue of concern. Adulteration includes biological, chemical 
or physical hazards and can be associated with economic or terroristic motives (Voss and Whipple, 2008). 
Eshkenazi (2013) notes that counterfeit food is becoming a big challenge in light of several scandals such as 
when horsemeat was mixed with beef in Europe via a complex network of slaughterhouses, processors, and 
other intermediaries. Especially worrisome is the potential use of supply chains by terrorists. In 2010, 
explosive material stuffed in printer cartridges was detected on cargo planes in the United Kingdom while in 
transit to the U.S. (The Telegraph, 2010). Consider a situation where a terrorist group embeds contaminated 
ingredients in a food/beverage or pharmaceutical supply chain. Wein and Liu’s (β005) simulation, which is 
based on California dairy data, shows that, on average, contaminated milk can result in 568,000 casualties 
within 3–6 days. These examples demonstrate that offenders have the capacity to exploit global supply 
chains in order to conduct illicit activities.  
Although the consequences of SCS breaches are immense and potentially devastating, little is 
known about what provokes firms to deploy SCS specific practices given that these practices also have the 
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potential to harvest adverse effects. On one hand, firms are investing in SCS to avert a crisis while satisfying 
governmental and customer policies/programs. On the other hand, SCS practices may have an adverse 
effect on costs, customer delivery lead time (Lee and Whang, 2005), and delivery reliability (Dobie, 2005) if 
more scrutiny is warranted. Thus, some firms may opt not to substantively deploy SCS practices. Additionally, 
since the probability of a catastrophic event is relatively scant (Fayol, 1989), justifying SCS investments may 
prove to be a futile exercise if relying merely on prototypical financial justifications (Lu and Koufteros, 2014). 
Unlike other strategic initiatives, which aim to directly improve financial performance (ROI, annual sales, etc.), 
the value of security and protection is only appreciated after failures do emerge. The effect on performance 
is often indirect and relatively covert. In addition, quantifying the financial impact of an averted incident is 
difficult and thus demonstrating a positive Return on Investment (ROI) becomes even more challenging. 
Williams et al. (2008) write specifically that some firms view security as an expense without a benefit. As a 
result, there is significant variance regarding the level of deployment of SCS practices across firms. A central 
challenge for advancing research, therefore, is to demonstrate why some firms deploy SCS practices and 
probe the efficacy of these practices to explain SCS performance.  
To address this issue, we first examine the antecedents of the deployment of SCS practices and 
subsequently study the impact of these practices on SCS performance using data from 166 U.S. 
manufacturing firms. We are particularly interested in coercive institutional pressures (Berrone et al., 2013) 
serving as antecedents because these pressures are principally salient in the realm of SCS management (Lu 
and Koufteros, 2014; Ritchie and Melnyk, 2011) where organizations attempt to safeguard their legitimacy 
(Berrone et al., 2013) with the respective government(s) and customers. As noted earlier, SCS is unique as 
positive return on investment is not always assured (Williams et al., 2008) and therefore external pressure 
alone cannot fully explain why organizations deploy SCS practices. Two salient internal forces, top 
management involvement (Balogun et al., 2015; Heavey and Simsek, 2015) and organizational culture, play 
a pivotal role in organizational action (Hult et al., 2002) and thus firms may demonstrate variance in their 
responses to similar institutional stimuli (Oliver, 1991; 1997). Pragmatically, external forces relate their 
pressure via the agency of top management (Liang et al. 2007). Top management may probe performance 
against aspiration levels and invest in practices that can raise SCS performance above a reference point 
(Arrfelt et al., 2013). Furthermore, culture has the capacity to shape practices through a process Bertels et 
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al. (2016) coined as cultural molding. Organizational culture may ease or debilitate the work of managers to 
exercise leadership and oversight over security management (Williams et al., 2008). Thus, we postulate that 
the effects of top management involvement on the deployment of SCS practices would be strengthened when 
the culture is sensitized to SCS concerns.  
This study contributes to the literature through its novel model, context, and positioning. First, our 
model is novel as we integrate both internal and external forces to study a context where organizational 
action is perhaps effectively mobilized only when both external and internal pressures are salient (Williams 
et al., 2008, 2012) and where financial justification is a thorny issue. Investments in prototypical environments 
usually rest on financial justifications (such as ROI) which are imposed or demanded by stockholders (Jensen 
and Murphy, 1990; Srivastava, 1983). The extant strategic management literature is primarily focusing on the 
role of top leaders when profit maximization or market performance are the dominant motives for strategic 
decision making. In essence, the literature has been preoccupied with decision making in an environment 
where there is very little strategic contradiction (Smith and Tushman, 2005); the assumption is that top 
managers make decisions with profit maximization/market performance as the sole underlying criterion. In 
the realm of SCS, there is a strategic contradiction because on the one hand top leaders are expected to 
attend to profit and market expectations while on the other hand they are expected to invest in SCS, which 
has definitive costs, uncertain ROI, and perhaps breeds adverse effects on operational performance. Based 
on our lengthy interactions with SCS practitioners, we deducted that the demands for SCS are instead 
imposed by the government and customers rather than typical constituents such as stockholders. In addition, 
returns on SCS investments cannot often be substantiated (Sheffi, 2005; Williams et al., 2008) despite that 
the consequences of SCS security breaches can be devastating, as we alluded earlier. Some of the 
practitioners we interviewed noted that investments in SCS can perhaps be paralleled to obtaining an 
insurance policy; the cost of insurance is real and certain but it is not definite that the insurance policy will be 
needed, at least on a regular basis. This is in line with the findings in both the network security literature and 
supply chain security literature—the value of security investments is not-so-visible (Siponen and Oinas-
Kukkonen, 2007). Materially, we invoke both the top management involvement and institutional theories to 
explain their concomitant role on SCS practice deployment where firms have to make investments that cannot 
be fully justified financially, at least on the outset.  
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Second, the examination of both types of coercive institutional pressures (i.e., government and 
customer) and their role is novel. Firms frequently do not face formidable coercive pressures from both the 
government and customers simultaneously. Typically, only one of those two forces exerts immense pressure 
in a given situation. For instance, Toyota as a customer may apply serious pressure on its supplier of 
speakers to improve the sound quality but the government has no interest in pressuring the supplier in this 
respect. On the other hand, the government may apply formidable pressure on a supplier to lower emissions 
but Toyota may only deliver minimal pressure. The case of SCS is an exception however as both entities 
demand compliance concurrently. In addition, our study offers new insights regarding the potential 
relationship between the two external coercive pressures. While the institutional literature proposes three 
types of pressures (coercive, normative, and mimetic), it seldom examines different sources of pressure 
within each type nor does it explore the potential relationships between these sources (see a comprehensive 
review in Johnston, 2013). To the best of our knowledge, Johnston (2013) is the only study in the literature 
that discusses whether institutional forces within the same type may affect each other, although its context 
(sport management) is very different from ours. Our results demonstrate that (1) coercive pressures can 
emanate from diverse sources; the institutional theory literature generally treats coercive pressure as a 
unidimensional entity but coercive pressure may emanate from multiple sources such as customers and 
respective governments, and (2) coercive pressures from different sources may affect each other; we found 
that the effect of government pressure on top management involvement is partially transmitted via customer 
pressure.  
Third, a significant gap in the SCS literature is that the practice-performance link is yet to be 
established empirically via a large sample of firms. There is a laundry list of practices prescribed/advocated 
by governments, international organizations (e.g., ISO), and leading firms (e.g., IBM) but yet we know very 
little regarding the efficacy of practices to explain SCS performance. Insights from few empirical inquiries 
(primarily qualitative interviews) produced mixed findings. For example, Sheu et al.’s interviews suggested 
that the value of the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) program was unclear. 
However, Ritchie and Melnyk (2011) demonstrated that firms could benefit if they were early C-TPAT 
adopters. There are also a number of conceptual papers in the literature advancing the notion that security 
related practices can engender better security performance. However, given the very topic being security, 
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firms are reluctant to disclose their choices of practices, their level, and performance implications because 
they do not want others (especially offenders) to know what actions/practices they undertake and they do not 
want to suffer any adverse effects on their insurance premiums, reputation, and public image. Despite the 
continuous call for more empirical validation (Williams et al., 2008; Cigolini et al., 2016), the effect of security 
related practices on security performance is still understudied (Ni et al., 2016; Williams et al., 2012). Similarly, 
Hu et al. (2007) state that one of the major hurdles in conducting empirical research on information systems 
security “is acquiring access to organizations and individuals who are willing to discuss information which is 
understandably sensitive. In general organizations and individuals are reluctant to talk about security issues 
for fear of being negatively impacted” (p. 160). Practically, our findings furnish some empirical evidence for 
firms to justify investments in their SCS. Furthermore, our robustness analyses probed different types of 
salient SCS practices (Lu et al., 2017) and discussed which type of practices may yield the strongest 
protection for supply chains. 
Fourth, our model also embraces the moderating effects of organizational culture. Specifically, it 
explores the effect of top management involvement on SCS practices in light of different levels of 
organizational culture. Surprisingly, we found that culture reaches its maximum potential when at moderate 
levels of sensitivity. While the organizational theory literature generally suggests that organizational culture 
positively moderates (i.e., monotonically increase) the effect of purposive actions on designed goals, our 
post-hoc analysis shows that such effect is complicated. When cultural sensitivity to SCS is low, management 
and employees may not be overly convinced to adopt SCS practices, which they may see as a threat/burden 
to their current job routines. On the other hand, when management and employees are highly sensitized to 
SCS issues (i.e., cultural sensitivity to SCS is high), purposive actions (i.e., top management involvement) 
may not be all that necessary as employees will undertake necessary practices out of their own volition. In 
this sense, our study is unique as it identifies an important and largely ignored phenomenon that has great 
managerial implications. Firms can rest on our empirical findings for support in order to fine tune their 
respective cultural climates in the context of SCS.  
 
2. Literature Review and Context  
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We review two related literature streams: supply chain security literature and network security 
literature. The latter is included because government and customers also place coercive pressure on 
organizations to improve information security (e.g., banking security, health information security, etc.).  
Closs and McGarrell (β004) define SCS management as “The application of policies, procedures, 
and technology to protect supply chain assets (product, facilities, equipment, information, and personnel) 
from theft, damage, or terrorism, and to prevent the introduction of unauthorized contraband, people or 
weapons of mass destruction into the supply chain” (p. 8). Sarathy (2006) notes that supply chains are difficult 
to protect because vulnerabilities span goods, factories, supply chain partners and their facilities, freight 
carriers, people, and information. In addition, given that supply chains are becoming geographically longer, 
they are susceptible to more disruptions, which breed opportunities for illicit activities. Speier et al. (2011) 
note that much of the supply chain is unguarded and emphasize that the breadth of the supply chain 
infrastructure makes total protection difficult. Following the literature, SCS breaches can emanate from 
numerous sources. Supply chain security pertains to threats such as theft, terrorism, counterfeit products, 
product adulteration, smuggling of goods or people, illicit use and acquisition of data, and sabotage. The 
same definition and scope have been adopted in recent SCS studies (e.g., Lu et al., 2017; Peleg-Gillai et al., 
2006; Williams et al., 2012). 
 Our literature review uncovered several important gaps which merit investigation. First, the empirical 
SCS literature (Williams et al., 2012) mainly focuses on the effects of SCS practices on collateral benefits 
(e.g., Rice and Spayd, 2005) but rarely attends to the antecedents of SCS practice deployment and its impact 
on SCS performance. The scarce empirical SCS literature attempts to explain SCS practice deployment via 
the lenses of the institutional theory. DiMaggio and Powell’s (198γ) seminal work on institutional theory 
stipulates three types of pressures that explicate firms’ conformance to institutions: coercive, mimetic, and 
normative. Ritchie and Melnyk (2011) examined whether the institutional context (i.e., weak or strong coercive 
and normative forces) moderates the relationship between investments in SCS, speed through customs, and 
competitive advantage. Although this research study focused only on one type of SCS threat (i.e., terrorism) 
via the deployment of the C-TPAT program, it did demonstrate that institutional forces do play a significant 
role, albeit indirectly. We note that Ritchie and Melnyk (2011) considered the role of institutional forces only 
implicitly; they assumed that early adopters of C-TPAT face a weak institutional environment while late 
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adopters face a strong institutional environment. In addition, the authors did not account for the potential 
mediating impact of internal forces. 
While there is some prior evidence that institutional forces may affect the deployment of specific 
practices, Dacin (1997) suggests that not all institutional pressures may impress firm action simultaneously 
and notes that the power (presence and effect) of institutional forces varies over time. Similarly, Berrone et 
al. (2013, p. 893) posit that the three institutional pressures “display varying degrees and their relevance is 
context-specific.” Precisely in the domain of SCS, Williams et al. (2009a) examined all three types of 
institutional forces, resting on 17 interviews. They found that the coercive pressure emanating from the host 
government(s) in the form of regulation, force, or persuasion is more forceful compared to other types of 
pressure. Lu and Koufteros (2014) argue that government and customer pressures are very salient in the 
introduction and growth stages of security program lifecycles while mimetic and normative pressures assume 
more prominence later on. They note that the effects of mimetic and normative pressures are not expected 
to bear significant impact on organizational behavior early on because security practices have not had 
enough time to prove themselves and thus attain legitimacy. They argue specifically that coercive pressures 
likely dominate the early stages. Our intimate interactions with practitioners (see the method section for 
details) corroborate with the literature. Specifically, our long and active engagement with a professional 
association dedicated to SCS afforded us the opportunity to interact with high level SCS executives. 
Collectively, these executives underscored that mimetic and normative pressures were not at play in their 
decision to implement SCS practices. They noted that pressure emanates from government regulations and 
incentives as well as subsequent customer pressure to assure supply chain level conformity and compliance. 
We thus purposively focus on coercive pressures which may be more salient presently. In our context, a 
government needs to secure supply chains not only to promote global trade but also to protect its citizens, 
their lifestyle, and livelihood (Sheffi, 2001, 2005). Customers, on the other hand, demand SCS to avoid losses 
associated with potential disruptions and to uphold their own legitimacy and reputation (Rice and Spayd, 
2005).  
While Williams et al. (2009a) and Ritchie and Melnyk (2011) focus on institutional forces, our study 
offers substantially different insights because we posit that the effect of institutional forces on SCS practices 
deployment is not direct (it is instead mediated via the agency of top management) and these forces may be 
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related to each other (government pressure affects customer pressure). Furthermore, the impact of top 
management involvement is subject to the prevailing organizational culture. Thus, our model is more 
comprehensive as it recognizes that both external and internal mechanisms impact SCS practice deployment.  
Second, organizational theory posits that organization action markedly rests on culture but the SCS 
literature focuses primarily on direct effects to the exclusion of important contingency factors. Smircich (1983) 
stresses that culture is an expression of values or social ideals and beliefs that are shared by organizational 
members. Rice and Spayed (β005, p. 4γ) refer to SCS culture as “socializing security.” If the organizational 
members believe that SCS is high priority and the sentiment is widely shared, the work of top managers 
would be facilitated as the employees would have a buy-in and assume the responsibility to protect the supply 
chain. Employees would not only acquiesce to top management’s action but would become strong advocates.  
Third, we identified only a few empirical studies concerning SCS practices and SCS performance 
but they largely rest on qualitative interviews. While this approach is necessary at an early stage of empirical 
inquiry, it suffers from generalizability due to small sample size considerations and sample selection bias 
(McGrath, 1982). Among the studies we reviewed, we found none have used large scale data to examine 
the antecedents of SCS practices and their effects on SCS performance. This is somewhat surprising given 
that the conceptual literature has repeatedly argued that SCS practices enhance SCS performance. For 
example, Closs and McGarrell (2004) explicitly suggest that adopting SCS practices could reduce theft, 
smuggling and terrorism attacks. Sarathy (2006) concurs and argues that firms should embed SCS practices 
into their overall supply chain risk management portfolio of practices rather than seek solutions on the 
aftermath of SCS breaches. Furthermore, the scant empirical findings are largely inconsistent and pertain to 
specific programs. On one hand, Thibault et al. (2006) produced results that the Container Security Initiative 
(CSI) imposed by the U.S. government has positive effects. Similarly, Ritchie and Melnyk (2011), using data 
obtained via the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agency of the U.S., demonstrate that benefits 
regarding custom clearance speed are contingent on whether the firm is an early or late C-TPAT adopter. 
On the other hand, Sheu et al.’s (2006) findings regarding the C-TPAT program are questioning its merits. 
While conceptual advances (Sarathy, 2006) and analytical models (Lee and Whang, 2005) suggest that the 
short-term costs associated with SCS practice deployment can be balanced out or out-weighted by long-term 
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gains from improved SCS performance, the impact of SCS practices on SCS performance has not been 
adequately established.  
While the SCS literature has remained relatively stagnant, the network security literature might offer 
some insights. Stakeholders such as government and customers have pressured firms to enhance network 
security in order to protect sensitive information. The recent Equifax data breach had exposed personal 
information (including social security numbers and birth dates) of 143 million U.S. consumers 
(https://www.csoonline.com/article/3223229/security/equifax-says-website-vulnerability-exposed-143-
million-us-consumers.html). The cost of the data breach in late 2013 at Target is reported to be over $200 
million, as published by Reuters on May 23, 2017. These are yet another reminder of the importance of 
security.  
Von Solms and Von Solms (2004) were some of the first to acknowledge the critical role of top 
management towards information security. The number one item in their list of top ten deadly sins in 
information security management is “not realizing information security is a corporate responsibility.” 
Puhakainen and Siponen (2010) and Chang and Lin (2007) represent some of the few studies that examined 
the instrumental role of top management and culture in the context of information security.   
The network security literature is generally concerned with four major security issues: access to 
information systems, secure communication, security management, and development of secure information 
systems (Siponen and Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007). Unlike supply chain security (the focus of our study), a strong 
emphasis is placed on technology (Kizza, 2017, Hu et al., 2007), and individual user compliance (Hu et al., 
2007, Hu et al., 2012). The supply chain security literature, on the other hand, acknowledges the positive role 
of technology but it generally advocates a plethora of other approaches to security.  
In an empirical study using case study methodology in one company, Hu et al. (2007) studied the 
role of external and internal pressures on information systems security. Relying on institutional theory, they 
examined the role of coercive, normative, and mimetic pressures. They found that coercive pressure 
demonstrated the most compelling force (via the example of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002) but normative and 
mimetic pressures played a different role. Specifically in reference to mimetic pressure, the authors state 
“When we asked interviewees in general about whether their behavior was influenced by the actions of other 
companies, the general response was ‘not really’” (p.166). Hu et al. (β007) found that the role of top 
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management was pivotal as government pressure required implementation of apposite controls over critical 
business processes and served “as a wake-up call and an important opportunity to initiate change 
management (p. 161).”  
The most proximal study to our inquiry is an empirical examination of employee compliance in the 
context of IT security (Hu et al., 2012); though, Hu et al. (2012) did not consider external institutional forces. 
In addition, they proposed a mediational model: they posited a direct effect from top management 
involvement to organizational culture and then from organizational culture to employee beliefs (i.e., culture 
served as a mediator) and policy compliance intention. Our study differs from it by modeling organizational 
culture as a moderator, akin to Tsui et al. (2006) who proposed a contingency perspective. Both models are 
theory-driven, yet competing in their explanation. Given this prior work, albeit in a different domain, we 
examined a mediation model in the robustness analyses section.  
 
3. Hypotheses Development 
Figure 1 depicts our research model and we elaborate the rational for each hypothesis below. 
--Insert Figure 1 about here-- 
3.1. Coercive Pressure and Top Management Involvement 
The institutional theory suggests that firms operate within a framework of assumed rules and values 
about what represents appropriate social behaviors (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). 
Compared to closed rational theories (e.g., quantitative oriented economic analysis), the institutional theory 
emphasizes social effects rather than just economic outcomes (Zukin and DiMaggio, 1990). Conformity to 
social requests contributes to firm success and survival because conforming firms are likely to gain social 
acceptance and thus reap societal resources (Baum and Oliver, 1991; Carroll and Hannan, 1989). As a result, 
many organizational decisions can be explained as ways to garner, influence, and maintain social 
justifications yet without careful efficiency consideration of these activities (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Zukin 
and DiMaggio, 1990). As elaborated earlier, we focus on coercive pressure. Coercive pressure results from 
both formal and informal influences exerted on firms by agencies upon which they are dependent. In our 
context, coercive pressures are mainly manifested by government pressure and customer pressure. 
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There are three reasons why government pressure can provoke top management involvement. First, 
the failure to adhere to legal prescriptions and regulations will likely result in loss of legitimacy (Lu and 
Koufteros, 2014). Atwater et al. (2010) report that about 110,000 motor carriers exited the industry in 2002. 
Many of these carriers ceased operations because they could not meet the stringent security regulations 
imposed by the U.S. government after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Top management, being at the helm of an 
organization, is subject to a copious amount of pressure to abide by government regulations/programs. 
Second, prior studies have demonstrated that firms that acquiesce to government pressure would in turn 
apply pressure to non-conforming firms to assent as well by treating non-conforming firms as meaningless, 
irrational and unnecessary (Meyer and Rowan, 1991). As a result, top managers may exploit compliance with 
government requirements and expectations to avoid questioning by peers. Finally, compliance with 
government programs (such as the C-TPAT program) could potentially lead to operational benefits (Closs 
and McGarrell, 2004; Ritchie and Melnyk, 2011). For instance, a failure to pursue and attain C-TPAT 
certification, though participation is “voluntary,” may culminate in longer lead times due to extra inspections 
and further scrutiny at ports (Ritchie and Melnyk, 2011) and can lead to market share losses as many firms 
only seek suppliers that are C-TPAT certified (Ritchie and Melnyk, 2011; Williams et al., 2009a). As one CEO 
states (Williams et al., 2009a, p. 60γ), “C-TPAT is the most voluntary, “non-voluntary” program in the history 
of the U.S. government.”  
Based on the extant literature, Oliver (1991, p. 150) cites a plethora of rewards that compliance or 
conformity may engender: These include elevated prestige, stability, legitimacy, social support, internal and 
external commitment, access to resources, attraction of personnel, acceptance in professions, and 
invulnerability to questioning. Given the direct and subtle pressure the government exerts on organizations, 
and given that government directives/policies are largely nonnegotiable (Berrone et al., 2013), top 
management involvement appears to be inevitable, although at varying levels. Top management develops a 
vision, forms strategic plans, and orchestrates resources (Sirmon et al., 2011) to pursue organizational action 
which is needed to assure compliance. We thus propose the following hypothesis:  




In a similar vein, customer pressure is also consequential to top management involvement. First, 
customers provide business opportunities. Complying with customer demands garners legitimacy and 
renders a supplier more attractive (Delmas and Montiel, 2009). As an early participant of C-TPAT, IBM 
asked/required its suppliers in 2002 to participate in this effort through a memorandum signed by its top 
procurement officer:  
“C-TPAT efforts are underway today. IBM has pledged full cooperation with this initiative. As a C-TPAT 
participant, IBM is assessing its own security practices. As an IBM supplier, you also have a role to play 
in ensuring the security of the supply chain. We are asking IBM's suppliers to assess, and enhance if 
necessary, their security processes in the following areas recommended by U.S. Customs: Physical 
Security, Access Control, Procedural Security, Personnel Security, Education and Awareness Training. 
Guidelines for establishing, improving, or amending supply chain security procedures are available on 
the U.S. Customs Web site, under Security Recommendation. Adherence to the C-TPAT security 
recommendations is critical to strengthening security for all supply chain members. Your assistance in 
this endeavor is required.  
 
Global Procurement, in conjunction with the IBM Import Compliance office, will be monitoring the supply 
chain security issue and will advise our suppliers of any new developments in this area.”(www-
3.ibm.com/procurement/proweb.nsf/ContentDocsBytitle/United+States~29+Jul+02:+Supply+Chain  
+Security?OpenDocument&Parent=Supplier+letters)  
A failure by top management to succumb to customer pressure and deploy necessary SCS practices, will be 
rather consequential to the relationship.  
Second, full compliance with customer pressure increases the opportunity of establishing new 
business with existing or new customers (Delmas and Montiel, 2009). Prior research relying on case study 
methodology demonstrates that non-compliance and loss of customers are correlated (Williams et al., 2009a). 
Recent studies suggest that buying firms are likely to turn to suppliers who have an established record of 
compliance (Williams et al., 2009a). Finally, a supplier “deep in the network” can significantly affect its 
customer’s operations (Kim et al., 2015). Lack of security on the supply side could significantly jeopardize 
the buying firm’s market share and reputation (Rice and Spayd, β005; Williams et al., 2009a) due to the 
potential disruptions that can emerge. These disruptions have the capacity to generate adverse effects on 
shareholder wealth and operational performance (Hendricks and Singhal, 2003; 2005). Therefore, when 
customers demonstrate a strong desire to enhance SCS performance, top management will be subjected to 
pressure to assume leadership and orchestrate resources to heighten SCS. Hence, we argue: 




Although government pressure and customer pressure are generally treated as separate forces in 
the SCS literature (Lun et al., 2008; Williams et al., 2009), a recent study in a different context suggests that 
they may be related to each other (Johnston, 2013). Johnston (2013) notes that institutional pressures are 
not exclusively distinct, particularly in an environment where stakeholders affect each other. This argument 
is also credible within the context of SCS where scholars have highlighted the need of interaction between 
government authorities and business firms (Lee and Whang, 2005). We posit that government pressure 
affects customer pressure. Customers are buying firms who are also subject to government regulations and 
demands. In many cases, they can fully comply with government regulations/demands only when their 
suppliers are also in compliance (http://www.cbp.gov/border-security/ports-entry/cargo-security/c-tpat-
customs-trade-artnership-against-terrorism). For instance, to obtain the highest level of C-TPAT certification, 
an accredited auditor is typically hired and is authorized to audit a focal firm’s supplier’s warehouse without 
advance notice. If the supplier is found to be non-compliant, or suspicious activities surface, the auditor has 
the authority to prevent the facility from releasing shipments and subsequently suspend the focal firm’s C-
TPAT certification. Thus, buying firms have the motivation to exert pressure on their suppliers to deploy SCS 
practices to ensure their own compliance. A buying firm’s security efforts can be easily nullified if its suppliers 
are non-compliant. Thus, customer pressure is related to government pressure.  
H3: Government pressure is positively associated with customer pressure. 
 
3.2. The Effects of Top Management Involvement on SCS practices 
Top management involvement is characterized as “the force that pulls different functional groups 
together (Swink, 2000; p. 211).” It is vital as SCS management faces several obstacles and top management 
is “indisputably important for strategic change” (Balogun et al. 2015, p. 960). First, employees may not 
understand SCS practices and their significance in averting and/or combating potential breaches. Many 
practices require that work is performed differently to assure the integrity of the supply chain and may impose 
additional job demands. This may lead employees to generate workarounds in order to simplify their work 
while however putting the supply chain at risk. Second, unless employees are motivated to adapt to new 
practices, they may informally rely on “old” ways and sometimes may even try to discredit the efficacy of 
“new” practices. Third, adopting and exploiting a SCS system demands additional financial and human 
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resources. Top management is needed to devise clear objectives, have an active oversight, provide funding 
for education, technology, and continuous improvement, and encourage frank discussion (Hu et al., 2012, 
Speier et al., 2011) about SCS and its implications. Williams et al. (2008) suggest that some firms decline to 
invest in SCS because of cost considerations. In other words, the significant costs to implement SCS 
initiatives coupled with the low probability of a major breach may motivate some firms to abstain from 
substantive investments in SCS and may instead be investing in window-dressing. Finally, top management’s 
boundary spanning role (Heavy and Simsek, 2015) can play a pivotal role. Top managers import external 
knowledge and integrate internal knowledge and can benchmark benefits against those derived by other 
firms in order to make proper adjustments to organizational action (Hu et al., 2012).  
We argue that the effects of coercive pressures are first felt by top management who then translates 
those demands into organizational action. Top management is responsible to alter procedures, rules, and 
routines. This explains why firms in the same industry, subject to the same coercive pressures, exhibit 
diversity in SCS practice deployment. The deployment of SCS practices rests on top leaders who may invest 
to bolster SCS without necessarily have the bona fide evidence on ROI as noted earlier. Taken together, we 
argue:  
H4: Top management involvement is positively associated with the deployment of SCS practices. 
 
3.3. Mediational Effects 
While we did not specify direct effects between coercive pressures and the deployment of SCS 
practices (which we test in our robustness analysis), it is likely that the effects are enduring but they might be 
indirect; the effects of coercive pressures on SCS practices are perhaps mediated via top management 
involvement through legitimization and commitment (Hu et al., 2012). Also, since top management plays a 
significant boundary spanning role, it serves as a focal interface with the environment and thus is likely to be 
the subject of institutional pressure. According to Liang et al. (2007), external pressure can only impact 
organizations when it affects the behavior of human agents such as top managers. Thus, we posit a 
mediational hypothesis. 
 
H5a-b: The effect of government pressure (a) and customer pressure (b) on the deployment of SCS 




3.4. The Moderating Role of Organizational Culture 
 Organizational culture has been referred to “the personality of the firm” (McAfee et al., 2002). It 
facilitates employees to understand how the firm functions and furnishes behavioral norms (McAfee et al., 
2002). Organizational culture stimulates employees to support and value behaviors it promotes (Barney, 
1986; Gray and Massimino, 2014). It also has the capacity to “perpetuate institutionalized structures and 
behaviors (Oliver, 1997, p. 700).” As a result, top management action can be enhanced when congruency 
exists between organizational culture and operations strategies (Alvesson and Willmott, 2002).  
A culture that is supportive of SCS can facilitate the deployment of SCS practices for at least two 
reasons. First, culture can energize employees. Firms with a culture that views SCS with respect will 
subsequently rally their employees around a set of meaningful values and goals toward SCS (Autry and 
Bobbitt, 2008). These values boost employee commitment, identification, and effort (Hu et al., 2012) because 
employees are inherently engaging with issues that matter to them and believe they should take some 
responsibility for SCS (Williams et al., 2009b). Harris (1994) examined how organizational culture influences 
the mental schema employees deploy for sense making and articulating apposite responses. Employees 
become more proactive and vigilant regarding SCS and go above and beyond the “requisite” activities; they 
actively detect and resolve threats as they perform daily tasks. Resolving SCS issues becomes a routine.  
Second, supporting cultures facilitate the effects of top management involvement on SCS practices 
deployment by shaping and coordinating employees’ behaviors. Norms guide employee behavior and 
decision making (McAfee et al., 2002). Unlike formal control systems, cultural norms imply social control and 
influence how social members perceive and interact with one another (Bettenhausen and Murnighan, 1991). 
Employees are likely to autonomously coordinate actions to assure excellence in SCS performance via SCS 
practices when the culture is supportive of SCS (Williams et al., 2009b). When the culture is well entrenched, 
the need for security as reflected by top management involvement can engender “congruency” within the firm 
and facilitate the deployment of SCS practices. On the other hand, managers “…can be trumped by employee 
actions that uphold some aspect of an existing culture (Bertels et al. 2016, p. 576).” Thus, we propose: 
 
H6: The effect of top management involvement on the deployment of SCS practices will be 
moderated by organizational culture such that the effects are heightened when organizational culture 




3.5. The Impact of SCS practices 
The extant literature has advocated (but rarely empirically examined) the positive link between the 
deployment of SCS practices and SCS performance (Giunipero and Eltantawy, 2004; Jüttner et al. 2003; 
Knemeyer et al., 2009; Sheffi, 2005). Based on the literature, SCS practices involve a variety of approaches 
to detect, diagnose and protect against SCS breaches, and continuously improve the system to combat SCS 
breaches. For example, practices tasked with detecting potential SCS breaches or practices that protect the 
supply chain (e.g., securing containers) from emerging security breaches will ease the pain because many 
of the security breaches can be simply averted (Knemeyer et al., 2009). Using an analogy from the quality 
management literature, companies find it more effective to prevent defects from emerging rather than coping 
with the defects that materialize (Lee and Whang, 2005). Diagnostic practices, on the other hand, reduce the 
probability that potential SCS threats are under-identified or ignored (Peleg-Gillai et al., 2006). Firms that 
deploy these practices usually scrutinize operational processes along the supply chain to uncover flaws and 
attempt to establish an effective and clear communication channel with suppliers, leading to better supply 
chain visibility (Knemeyer et al., 2009). Contingency planning fashions resilience which results in sustained 
business continuity (Sheffi, 2005; Bakshi and Kleindorfer, 2009). Consequently, the supply chain can 
effectively respond to potential breaches. The adoption of these practices puts firms in a better position to 
cope with SCS challenges and thus attain better SCS performance. In line with the literature, we propose:  
H7: The deployment of SCS practices is positively associated with SCS performance. 
 
4. Methods and Results 
4.1. Research Design and Sample Characteristics 
Our targeted population included manufacturing units (a firm or a strategic business unit) located in 
the U.S. Appreciating the sensitivity of the topic and its potential adverse effect on response rates (Williams 
et al., 2012), we did not limit our target pool of firms to any specific manufacturing related SIC code. Given 
the pervasive impact of SCS breaches, we conjecture that firms across industries would face SCS challenges 
to some degree, and would realize the pressure to adopt SCS practices.  
We undertook a multi-staged preliminary inquiry prior to collecting data from a large sample of firms. 
To inform and enrich our understanding of SCS issues, the authors first actively attended by invitation 
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numerous meetings of the Transported Asset Protection Association (TAPA) over the last six years. This is 
a closed group of SCS executives from a variety of industries that are tasked to protect their respective supply 
chains. Regular participation draws also from law enforcement at local, state, and federal levels. We had the 
opportunity to benefit from discussions regarding government regulations, new threats and strategies and 
how they affect SCS,  and gathered that there is very little knowledge regarding the efficacy of SCS practices 
to explain SCS performance. We also had short interviews with TAPA members to assure that relevant 
variables are adequately embodied in our inquiry. During the interviews, we not only discussed practices 
advocated in promising SCS programs but also sought to understand practices that were employed by 
practitioners but ignored by the literature. We also learned, for instance, that often the same practice may be 
labeled differently by firms or security programs. This allowed us to curb content redundancy in our survey. 
Furthermore, we solicited their insights regarding coercive institutional pressures. It became abundantly clear 
in our discussions that the government and customers serve as the two most pivotal forces exerting pressure 
for the adoption of SCS practices. The executives cited numerous government programs (such as the C-
TPAT, Importer Security Filing - ISF, FAST, etc.) that emerged over the years and their specific impact on 
organizational practices. In addition, the executives noted that top management involvement varied across 
firms; leadership at firms that sustained recent serious incidences was in general more engaged and 
championed organizational action.  
In the next stage, we interviewed 11 supply chain executives who are subject matter experts and 
four academics who work in the area of SCS. Our objective was to solicit their feedback on the clarity, and 
content and face validity of the survey questions, which we gathered based on our literature review and our 
interactions with practicing executives. The authors then officially presented their findings to the TAPA 
audience on multiple meetings and obtained valuable feedback. At the last stage of instrument development, 
we also undertook a pilot study to obtain tentative assessments of validity and reliability by relying on 
responses from 39 supply chain executives who are members of the Council of Supply Chain Management 
Professionals (CSCMP).    
We targeted high and middle-level supply chain executives, since these are the individuals who have 
sound knowledge of external pressures and internal forces leading to the deployment of SCS practices. They 
would also be knowledgeable about specific SCS practices and SCS performance. Interactions with TAPA 
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members helped us understand who are the best-fitting respondents and helped us craft "filter" questions for 
our survey. Based on the conversation with these high-ranking executives, we also learned more details 
about the attributes of SCS managers working in respective industries, which lead to the confidence that our 
sample is representative. For example, the average number of years of experience (reported in the next 
paragraph) is very close to what we expected based on our inquiries with TAPA members. We targeted 
respondents who (1) hold at least a managerial (or equivalent) designation, (2) work in the manufacturing 
sector, (3) and work in areas which are directly related to supply chain management and security. A panel of 
1,543 potential respondents was identified via Qualtrics.com panels by relying on our selection criteria which 
included firm size in excess of 100 employees and several other screening questions, in addition to the three 
criteria above. In our description to practitioners, we did not want to limit threats only to a given specific 
source. Instead, we indicated that supply chain security pertains to threats such as theft, terrorism, counterfeit 
products, product adulteration, smuggling of goods or people, and sabotage. Qualtrics.com sent two spaced 
reminders (five days apart) on behalf of the authors. The IP addresses recorded by Qualtrics.com suggest 
that the responses are unique and are geographically dispersed. Using a random sample of 25 firms, we 
were able to match each IP address with specific locations of businesses in order to assure that we obtained 
legitimate responses. On average, each respondent completed the survey in 15.53 minutes with a median of 
13.10 minutes. This was a very reasonable duration given the length of the survey. The research team paid 
Qualtrics.com $50 for each useable response.  
 The data collection process yielded 166 usable responses with a response rate of 10.8% (166/1543). 
The response rate compares favorably with other survey studies in the overly sensitive domain of SCS (e.g., 
Williams et al., 2009b, 2012). Table 1 reports the characteristics of the sample. The typical designation of the 
respondents includes President or VP Manufacturing/SCM/Operations/Logistics, and Director and Manager 
of similar functional areas. About 45% of the respondents held a position at the director level or above. In 
fact, ββ% of respondents were Vice Presidents or held a “C” level designation. On average, each respondent 
had 13.40 years of experience at the firm (median=11) suggesting a wealth of knowledge regarding specific 
organizational issues. Our research design included only respondents that had indicated direct knowledge of 
the practices/activities (individuals that indicated lack of such knowledge were automatically excluded from 
responding to the survey via screening questions) their respective organization undertakes to protect itself 
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against security threats. Thus, we have confidence that our participants have subject matter knowledge. A 
majority of participating firms (95%) have annual sales of over $10 million while 34% have annual sales of 
over $1 billion. In terms of commerce type, a total of 54% of firms operate in the business-to-business 
environment, 26% operate in the business-to-consumer environment, and the rest serve both business 
partners and consumers. 
--Insert Table 1 about Here-- 
 
4.2. Variables and Survey Instrument 
We developed the survey indicators based on extensive interviews with subject matter experts and 
a thorough review of the strategic management, organizational theory, and supply chain management 
literatures. All survey indicators were scored on a seven point Likert type scale, where 1 represented “Not at 
all” and 7 represented “A great deal.” All variables were operationalized via multi-item scales.  
Coercive isomorphism results from both formal and informal pressures exerted on organizations by 
agencies upon which they are dependent. The typical sources of coercive pressure in our context could be 
traced to the government who sets, for example, trade regulations or major customers who provide business 
opportunities. In many cases, organizational change is a direct response to a government mandate: for 
example, the 100% inspection of U.S.-bound containers policy forces importers and international carriers to 
implement internal controls and processes such that they can work within the legal framework prescribed by 
U.S. laws. Customers can exert a strong impact on suppliers and their leadership because simply customers 
are the main business or resource providers (Tolbert et al., 2011). The indicators of government pressure 
and customer pressure were largely adapted from prior studies; i.e., Liang et al. (2007), Heugens and Lander 
(2009), and Williams et al. (2008). These indicators reflect formal and informal pressure imposed on an 
organization to conform by virtue of requirements or incentives. 
Top management involvement reflects the degree of engagement of top leaders and goes above 
and beyond mere sensitivities regarding SCS. This involvement is rather salient in the realm of SCS as the 
firm and its supply chain are subject to a significant number of threats; some imminent and some distant, 
some minor and some potentially catastrophic. Top management is responsible to set clear objectives for 
securing the supply chain and allocate requisite levels of resources to assure proper execution. Top 
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management assumes an active leadership and oversight role in order to signal to the rest of the supply 
chain constituents that security does matter (Hu et al., 2012). Top management involvement (Mintzberg, 
1979; Lambert et al., 1998) reflects the active engagement of top management but also reflects its sensitivity 
toward risk management (Rodríguez et al., 2008). We specified five indicators which measure the extent to 
which top managers appropriately allocate resources and orchestrate managerial effort for SCS (Hu et al., 
2012; Knemeyer et al., 2009). 
Schein (1986) characterizes culture as a coping mechanism that employees use to deal with 
problems of external adaptation and internal integration and describes it as ‘‘the basic assumptions and 
beliefs that are shared by members of an organization, that operate unconsciously and define in a ‘taken for 
granted’ fashion, an organization’s view of itself and its environment’’ (p. 6). Rice and Spayed (2005, p. 43) 
refer to SCS culture specifically as “socializing security.” Alternatively, we can view SCS as a cultural 
phenomenon (Cameron and Sine, 1999). In essence, culture in our study reflects the shared beliefs of 
organizational members regarding SCS. It reflects their sensitivities to security breaches and whether SCS 
is a sentiment widely shared within the organization (Hu et al. 2012). If individuals believe that even minor 
security breaches can cause havoc in their respective supply chain, they would be more willing to personally 
invest in SCS and thus be the catalyst in translating top management’s involvement into action. Security-
oriented organizational culture was operationalized via shared beliefs regarding SCS (Williams et al., 2009b; 
Speier et al., 2011). This conceptualization is consistent with Leidner and Kayworth (2006).  
Since SCS breaches represent a special form of supply chain risk, it is conducive to borrow concepts 
from the extant literature on risk management and SCS specific programs such as ISO 28000. ISO 28000 
clearly asserts that the organization needs to constantly assess the security environment in which it operates 
(i.e., detection and diagnostic practices are needed) along with the respective risk in order to decipher 
whether adjustments and countermeasures are needed (i.e., contingency planning) in terms of structure or 
personnel and its training (i.e., continuous improvement). To prevent breaches, the organization has to 
deploy protective practices (i.e., protection) along the supply chain which may be accompanied with opting 
for suppliers (i.e., supplier selection) based on their SCS performance. We specified six first-order constructs 
that reflect the most salient practices of ISO 28000 and represent the core aspects of risk management as 
advocated by Starr and Van Wassenhove (2014); SCS practices include detection, diagnostic, protection, 
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supplier selection, contingency planning and continuous improvement (Closs and McGarrell, 2004; Peleg-
Gillai et al., 2006; Rice and Spayd, 2005; Sheffi, 2001, 2005). The deployment of these six SCS practices 
received tacit endorsement from TAPA members who we interviewed and who also had the opportunity to 
attend our presentations and our Q & A sessions. They thought that our treatment of practices was fairly 
comprehensive, covering the domain of SCS practices. Each of these is described in (online) Appendix A. 
We believe that SCS practices share their intent to protect the supply chain and usually organizations deploy 
them as a bundle as part of a SCS program such as ISO 28000. Thus, their levels should be highly correlated 
and subsequently the construct of SCS practice was specified using a second-order latent variable orientation. 
The items of SCS performance included seven indicators in order to embody the different nuances discussed 
in prior studies (Closs and McGarrell, 2004; Peleg-Gillai et al., 2006; Rice and Spayd, 2005; Lu et al., 2017).  
The survey instrument was first administered, as noted earlier, to 39 supply chain management 
executives as a means to pilot-test it. The responses indicated that one meaningful factor can be extracted 
when each variable was examined via within block EFA; in addition, all Cronbach’s alpha reliability estimates 
were above 0.67. These findings were rather reassuring but some changes were made to assure validity 
(face, content, convergent, and discriminant) and reliability. For instance, we added an additional indicator 
for supplier selection and changed the wording on other indicators. 
 
4.3. Research Methodology and Results 
Before we tested the substantive hypotheses, we assessed measurement issues and common 
method bias. First, we examined via Mplus 7.2 whether a 2nd order latent factor specification for SCS 
practices can be supported. In addition, due to the number of latent variables at the first level of abstraction 
(i.e., 11) and the number of indicators (i.e., 51), we specified two measurement models; the first included the 
two coercive pressures, top management involvement, and culture while the second included the SCS 
practices and SCS performance. We subsequently assessed model fit, convergent validity, and reliability 
within each measurement model. To assure discriminant validity across the two measurement models, we 
tested for all pairs of variables across both measurement models using a ぬ2 difference test. Details about the 
measurement models appear in (online) Appendix D.  
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Using a series of nested models, the ぬ2 associated with the second-order model for SCS practices 
is statistically invariant (ぬ2diff=13.54, 9 df, p>0.14) from the ぬ2 generated when a first-order correlated variable 
model is specified (online Appendix C). Given its conceptual simplicity and considering that firms think of a 
“system” of interrelated practices, the second-order model can be supported.  
Furthermore, the first measurement model produced acceptable model fit statistics (Hult and 
Ketchen, 2001; Shook et al., 2004): ぬ2(98)=1γ9.41, ぬ2/df=1.42, CFI=0.95, TLI=0.93, SRMR=0.06 and 
RMSEA=0.07. The second measurement model produced acceptable fit indices as well: ぬ2(521)=759.12, 
ぬ2/df=1.46, CFI=0.91, TLI=0.90, SRMR=0.06, and RMSEA=0.07. These fit indices suggest congruence 
between the models we specified and the data. In both measurement models, all item-factor loadings were 
substantive in magnitude (only two items had coefficients below 0.60) and statistically significant at the 0.001 
level, suggesting convergent validity. Each pair-wise ぬ2 difference test was significant at the level of 0.01, 
providing evidence of discriminant validity. Composite reliabilities (CR) (Hult and Ketchen, 2001; Shook et 
al., 2004) ranged from 0.76 to 0.93 and average variance extracted (AVE) ranged from 0.51 to 0.83. 
Collectively, there is sufficient evidence demonstrating construct validity and construct reliability. Table 2 
reports the means, standard deviations, and correlations of the non-categorical variables. Appendix E (Online) 
displays the indicators of each construct and their respective standardized factor loadings, CRs, and AVEs.  
--Insert Table 2 about here-- 
 In order to examine the indirect effects of coercive institutional pressures on SCS practices 
deployment and performance, we performed mediation analysis using a bootstrapping approach (Preacher 
and Hayes, 2008); we attained bias corrected confidence intervals by specifying 5,000 iterations.  
 A number of control variables were included to ensure that we can isolate the effects of our 
explanatory variables. We included several control variables describing firm characteristics: size, profit 
margin, and market share. Firm size was operationalized by annual sales. Large firms and those with high 
profit margin (those with broader resource availability, Ritchie and Melnyk (2011), or those with sufficient 
slack, Berrone et al. (2013)) may have more resources to deploy towards SCS practices. Firms with large 
market share are more visible and thus perhaps more sensitive to their reputation, leading them to invest 
more heavily to protect their supply chains. On the other hand, small firms may be more agile in responding 
to environmental stimuli (Dean et al., 1998). We also controlled for industry effects (Short et al., 2007) as 
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some industries may be more sensitive to SCS breaches; for instance, the food, beverage, and 
pharmaceutics industries may be more vigilant because their products are consumed by humans and thus 
breaches are laden with more risk. Overall, the data included responses from 11 sectors: food and kindred 
products (10.2%), paper and allied products (4.2%), chemical and allied products (7.2%), primary metal 
products (5.4%), fabricated metal products (6.6%), commercial machinery (5.4%), electronic products (6.6%), 
transportation equipment (9.0%), analyzing and controlling instruments (6.6%), general equipment (21.7%), 
and others (16.5%).  
We centered explanatory variables at the individual indicator level to mitigate potential 
multicollinearity. Given that multiple independent variables are posited as explanatory variables of SCS 
practices, we used SPSS to obtain variance inflation (VIF) scores and condition indices aside from our main 
SEM analysis. We also assessed for the presence of outliers, influential observations, and normality. The 
data analysis did not produce any worrisome information that would demand further action.  
Before we assessed the hypotheses we also addressed common-method bias (CMB) (online 
Appendix F). Using a variety of methodologies (such as a marker variable technique), there was no evidence 
to suggest that CMB merits concern.  
 
4.4. Hypotheses Results  
Given the satisfactory measurements, we proceeded with the examination of the structural model; 
the fit indices ぬ2=616.07 (465), ぬ2/df = 1.32, CFI=.931, TLI=.919, RMSEA=.063, 90% C.I. RMSEA (.048, .075) 
suggest a well-fitting model. It is noted that deployment of SCS practices was modeled here as a second-
order factor via total aggregation at the first level of abstraction as practices are often implemented as a 
program or system. Firm size was the only control variable that demonstrates a significant effect (+) on the 
deployment of SCS practices. Other control variables exhibited negligible effects. We identified no counter-
intuitive findings related to control variables. Table 3 reports the results. 
--Insert Table 3 about here-- 
H1, H2 and H3 hypothesized direct relations amongst the coercive pressures and with top 
management involvement. The results provide support for H1 which proposed that government pressure is 
positively associated with top management involvement (け=0.598, p=0.000). The analysis also supports H2 
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which hypothesized that customer pressure is positively associated with top management involvement 
(く=0.370, p=0.013). Our findings are consistent with the institutional logic which posits that external coercive 
pressures have a sizable direct impact on top management involvement (Liang et al., 2007). H3 proposed 
that customer pressure is positively related to government pressure. The results provide support for this 
hypothesis (け =0.757, p=0.000) and suggest that the relationship amongst coercive pressures might exist at 
least within the realm of SCS.  
H4 proposed that top management involvement is positively related to the deployment of SCS 
practices. The results support this assertion (く=0.409, p=0.013). Collectively, the results suggest that the 
effects of government pressure and customer pressure on the deployment of SCS practices can perhaps be 
transited through top management involvement (Liang et al., 2007). Using a bootstrap process (Table 4), we 
found all indirect paths (total and specific) from government pressure (H5a) and customer pressure (H5b) to 
the deployment of SCS practices and then to SCS performance to be statistically significant; all the 
confidence intervals were positive and did not include zero.  
--Insert Table 4 about here-- 
H6 argued that the relationship between top management involvement and the deployment of SCS 
practices would be more salient in the presence of an organizational culture that is sensitive to SCS. The 
results (Table 3) illustrate that such culture positively interacted with top management involvement (く=0.225, 
p=0.001). In order to examine the interaction effect more closely, we examined the conditional effect of top 
management involvement on the deployment of SCS practices at different values of the moderator using the 
Johnson-Neyman technique via the Process Model in SPSS (Table 5). These results are rather interesting 
and reveal where exactly on the spectrum of organizational culture the effect of top management involvement 
on SCS practices is statistically significant. Table 5 suggests that when the organizational culture is not 
sensitive at all to SCS concerns, the effect of top management involvement on the deployment of SCS 
practices is not statistically significant. On the other hand, when the organizational members become more 
concerned about SCS issues, top management involvement becomes consequential for SCS practices. 
However, it is apparent that although at the very high levels of cultural sensitivity the effects of top 
management involvement on the deployment of SCS practices are still positive and statistically significant, 
they are diminishing vis-à-vis the effects of top management involvement at moderate levels of cultural 
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sensitivity. In essence, the effects of top management involvement on the deployment of SCS practices 
appear to be the strongest when the organization is moderately sensitized to SCS issues. This was confirmed 
by running three supplementary regression models via SPSS relating top management involvement and the 
deployment of SCS practices, one for each level of organizational culture (low, moderate, and high – based 
on quartiles) while controlling for the same variables as our prior models. The standardized coefficients for 
top management involvement are .528 (p=0.004), .598 (p=0.000), and .465 (p=0.002) at the three cultural 
levels respectively. The interaction was also probed via ANCOVA (Figure 2). Figure 2 illustrates that the 
marginal mean of SCS practice deployment is in general higher when the organizational culture is more 
sensitive to SCS. It is evident that the marginal effects are more pronounced at moderate levels of cultural 
sensitivity.  
--Insert Figure 2 and Table 5 about here-- 
H7 predicted that the deployment of SCS practices positively impact SCS performance. Consistent 
with H7, the deployment of SCS practices exhibits a significant positive effect on SCS performance (く=0.939, 
p=0.000). Thus, H7 is supported.  
 
4.5. Post-hoc Analysis  
 The literature generally suggests that organizational culture will positively moderate the effect of 
purposive action on its designed goals when the action is in line with what the culture promotes. However, it 
carries an implicit linear assumption that the moderation effect will increase monotonically with the moderator. 
Nonetheless, our test of H6 suggests that the moderation effect can be complicated under some 
circumstances. The moderation effect may be non-linear. As we observed, organizational culture reaches its 
strongest marginal effect at moderate levels and not the highest levels. To further explore our finding, we 
tested a model using a higher-order model. The model included top management involvement (top), security-
oriented culture (culture), square of culture (culture2), top x culture, top x culture2, and the same set of control 
variables used in our main analysis. The results reveal that top x culture2 is marginally significant at 0.1 level 
(p-value = 0.10) when the first order interaction is controlled for. This provides some empirical evidence of a 
phenomenon that is largely ignored in the literature but has great managerial implications: organizational 
culture may serve as a non-linear moderator. Low levels of culture do not motivate additional response to 
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purposeful actions (top management involvement in our case) while very high levels of culture may render 
purposeful actions redundant. We discuss these findings in the discussion section.      
 
4.6. Robustness Analyses  
We performed four additional types of analysis. First, while we specified indirect effects between 
coercive pressures and the deployment of SCS practices (full mediation via top management involvement) 
in our main analysis, it is possible that the effects can also be direct (partial mediation). We thus specified 
direct paths between the two coercive mechanisms and deployment of SCS practices and examined the 
efficacy of a partial mediation model vis-à-vis a full mediation model via a ぬ2 test. The difference in ぬ2 (616.07-
610.58 < 5.99, 2 df) is not statistically significant and this suggests that the full mediation model is preferred 
over the partial mediation model since the latter does not fit the data any better; the full mediation model is 
more parsimonious without suffering any statistically significant loss in model fit.   
Second, Hu et al. (2012) studied employee compliance in the context of IT security, though they did 
not consider external institutional forces such as government and customer pressure. They proposed a direct 
effect from top management involvement to organizational culture and then from organizational culture to 
employee beliefs and policy compliance intention (i.e., culture served as a mediator). Our inquiry, on the 
other hand, models organizational culture as a moderator and thus studies the interaction between top 
management involvement and organizational culture. Both models have their respective theoretical but 
competing rationales. If we just tested however only a mediation model following this literature, the interesting 
yet counter-intuitive finding—the moderating effect of organizational culture appears to be non-linear—would 
be concealed. To consider the competing rationale, we also run a mediational model. The results are in line 
with Hu et al. (2012) such that top management involvement strongly affects organizational culture (く=0.949, 
p=0.000) and culture strongly affects the deployment of SCS practices (く=0.865, p=0.000).  
Third, we correlated each of the six SCS practices with SCS performance in order to ascertain 
whether SCS practices impact performance uniformly. As we noted earlier, firms typically implement these 
practices in a systemic fashion as part of an overarching program such as ISO 28000. We found statistically 
significant correlations with SCS performance for all practices and the magnitudes suggest substantive 
significance as well: Detection (p-value=0.729**), Diagnostic (0.742**), Protective (0.667**), Supplier Selection 
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(0.698**), Contingency Planning (0.733**), and Continuous Improvement (0.734**). While the individual means 
and standard deviations of these practices somewhat differ (Detection – mean= 4.54, SD=1.35, Diagnostic 
– mean=4.55, SD=1.60, Protective – mean=5.19, SD=1.31, Supplier Selection – mean=4.68, SD=1.63, 
Contingency Planning – mean=5.05, SD=1.39, and Continuous Improvement – mean=4.72, SD=1.60), their 
covariation with SCS performance appears to be fairly uniform. 
Fourth, while we did follow the advice of the SCS literature (e.g., Lu et al., 2017) and adopted a 
second-order construct of SCS practices in an attempt to adequately cover as comprehensively as possible 
the set of practices firms implement to combat supply chain security threats, we acknowledge that this may 
conceal the differences among these first-order practices. We thus reran our analysis by using six first-order 
constructs of SCS practices in lieu of the second-order construct. The results demonstrate that culture only 
moderates the top management involvement’s effect on detection (く=0.116, p=0.044) and supplier selection 
practices (く=0.098, p=0.091). Collectively, the robustness findings suggest that while all six sets of practices 
are conducive to better security performance, a security-oriented organizational culture only alters the 
relationship between top management involvement and SCS practices only for two of them.  
 
5. Discussion 
From an external environment perspective, we have demonstrated the cogent impact of 
governmental and customer pressures on top management involvement, and from an internal standpoint, we 
showed that top management involvement positively influences the deployment of SCS practices. 
Harmonizing these two perspectives, our findings suggest that the impact of external coercive pressures is 
mainly transmitted via internal mechanisms such as top management involvement. Given the limited 
empirical research related to the deployment of SCS practices, our findings provide a better understanding 
of factors that drive firms to deploy such practices. These results argue for a combination of a push and pull 
approach to deploy SCS practices, i.e., from an external perspective, firms are influenced by the push lever 
through coercive pressures and from an internal standpoint, top management involvement acts as a pull lever. 
While one can argue that push comes before pull, it is evident that both levers are critical for deployment of 
SCS practices and firms may not achieve desired outcomes without either of them. In addition, we have 
demonstrated that the relationship between top management involvement and deployment of SCS practices 
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varies by levels of organizational culture. This finding sheds light on internal characteristics that play a vital 
role in deploying SCS practices, which lead to improved SCS performance.  
 
5.1. Theoretical Contributions 
The critical role of top managers has been recognized in the literature (Eisenhardt et al., 1997; Floyd 
and Lane 2000). However, prior studies largely focus on the personal characteristics of top managers (e.g., 
Hambrick and Mason, 1984) and the direct impact of top management on organizational strategies. Our 
theoretical model suggests that top managers not only affect the organizational behaviors directly, but more 
importantly serve as the medium through which external coercive pressure impacts organizational action. 
The findings are consistent with Teo et al. (2003) and Liang et al. (2007) who advanced similar arguments, 
albeit in a different domain. 
External coercive pressures often exist within social legal systems. The existence of a legal system 
can affect many aspects of firm behavior. The classic economic school of thought argues that firms would 
only adopt initiatives if required by coercive forces (Walley and Whitehead, 1994). However, our robustness 
analysis suggests that the partial mediation model does not explain additional variance to warrant its support. 
Yet the impact of external forces on internal top management involvement appears to be rather strong, 
suggesting that the effects of government and customer pressures are mainly transited through top 
management involvement (i.e., the full mediation model).  
The significant and positive relationship between government pressure and customer pressure also 
deserves further discussion. The extant institutional theory literature largely treats the two types of coercion 
at the same level of position within a nomological network. However, theoretically, government pressure 
exists at a higher level because government pressure within the same industry frequently applies to both the 
focal firm and its customers. Government pressure thus also shapes customer’s demands on the focal firm. 
The strong relation between the two types of pressure indicates that customer pressure on a focal firm reflects 
partly the government pressure the customer is subjected to. As a result, the effect of customer pressure on 
top management involvement should be interpreted with caution. If customer pressure serves as an 
intermediary link between government pressure and top management involvement, then the effect involves 
more than just the will of the customers. It may reflect the joined effect of both government pressure and 
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customer pressure. The discovery adds to our understanding regarding how regulations shape organizational 
behaviors. Furthermore, the finding adds to the institutional theory literature which in general does not 
acknowledge relationships between the same type of institutional forces.      
The findings also illustrate that the effect of top management involvement on SCS practices 
deployment is subject to organizational culture (Williams et al., 2009b) such that the effects are more 
positively pronounced when the culture is sensitive to security. We probed the interaction using a variety of 
techniques and the results are rather interesting. On the aggregate, there is significant evidence to indicate 
that the effect of top management involvement on the deployment of SCS practices varies with the cultural 
sensitivity regarding SCS issues. However, when the interaction was examined more closely via the Johnson-
Neyman technique it became apparent that at very low levels of cultural sensitivity to SCS, increasing top 
management involvement will not bear significant returns in the form of higher deployment of SCS practices. 
Table 5 suggests that as the level of cultural sensitivity regarding SCS increases, the impact of top 
management involvement becomes more salient but it appears to be most efficacious at moderate levels of 
such cultural sensitivity. The effects of top management involvement were still positive and statistically 
significant at very high levels of cultural sensitivity but there is a marked deterioration of the potency of top 
management involvement. This was also confirmed by running post-hoc supplementary regression models. 
When the pro-security cultural sensitivity is very low, high top management involvement may be interpreted 
as micromanagement or unwarranted interference and thus resistance may ensue. Employees may also 
interpret the push for SCS practices as an attempt by top management to monitor them; SCS may be 
perceived as a mere guise to institute more surveillance on organizational actors. Gilbert et al. (2012) note 
that employee stress, decreased job satisfaction, and feelings of social isolation have been linked to 
employee monitoring. Thus, when employees are not sensitized to SCS and its implications, they may not 
be overly committed to adopt SCS practices which they may see as a threat. On the other hand, when 
employees are highly sensitized to SCS issues, top management involvement may not be all that necessary 
as employees will undertake necessary practices out of their own volition; thus the effects of top management 
involvement may wane down. As expected, SCS practices are related to SCS performance. The effect size 




Our robustness analyses suggest that organizational culture does not uniformly moderate the effect 
of top management involvement on the six security practices. Instead, its moderation effect is only salient 
when detection practices and supplier selection practices are considered. We posit that this maybe because 
some practices are more effective than other practices in combating security threats (Lu et al., 2017). Firms 
have accumulated experiences and promoted these practices. We note that Lu et al. (2017) found that 
detection practices have the more potent effects on security performance. Given that detection practices 
represent one of the most effective means to mitigate supply chain risk (Lu et al., 2017), the findings 
collectively suggest that detection practices may be the most efficacious action undertaken to secure supply 
chains and reduce supply chain risks.   
 
5.2. Managerial Implications 
The findings carry with them several managerial implications. First, the results identify top 
management involvement as a pivotal factor in improving SCS performance. The firm’s existing structures 
create inertia which promotes the status quo, even if performance downturns are present (Tushman and 
Romanelli, 1985). Such inertia is rather robust and often impedes the deployment of new and potentially 
beneficial organizational actions (Normann, 1977). Without effective involvement from top managers, the 
implementation of new practices is unlikely to be successful (Liang et al., 2007). Our empirical findings 
reinforce this point. Pragmatically, firms must understand that top management involvement is the key to 
substantiate the organizational security efforts. Likewise, top leadership should understand that breaches in 
security can rattle their own positions and status within the organization. For instance, Starnes (2016) and 
Southern (2017) note that CEOs do lose their jobs over data breaches. Thus, awareness of the threats and 
active engagement by top management are vital elements to SCS. 
While most studies on top management involvement took a top-down approach by assuming top 
leaders have ultimate authority within organizations (e.g., Villena et al., 2018), our study provides some 
empirical evidence that top leaders are subject to external pressures in the context of SCS. Given the pivotal 
role of top management involvement, our findings suggest that a bottom-up approach can also be crucial in 
protecting supply chains. That is, supply chain managers should affect top leaders’ perception of external 
pressures, threats, and incite (top leaders’) actions. Supply chain managers may proactively advocate the 
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importance of SCS and draw attention from top leaders through the means of issue selling and initiative 
taking (Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008). Hu et al. (2007) also acknowledged the role of a bottom-up approach 
in the context of information system security. We found top management involvement strongly affects 
organizational culture in our robustness analyses. Coupled with the finding that the moderating effect of 
organizational culture is most salient at moderate levels in our main analyses, we conjecture that there may 
be an optimal level of top management involvement that interacts with the cultural climate to maximize supply 
chain security outcomes. While a bit out of the scope of this study, we posit that when the organizational 
culture is not characterized by its sensitivity to SCS, middle managers should engage the top leadership to 
increase their active involvement by rousing concerns, solutions, and opportunities together. However, when 
the organizational culture is already highly sensitized about SCS, top management heavy involvement may 
be somewhat redundant; in fact, such heavy involvement may induce employee sense of over-monitoring.       
Further, supply chain managers may also promote an organizational culture which eventually 
facilitates the deployment of SCS practices. Russell and Saldanha (2003) estimated the cost to protect the 
supply chains in the U.S. at over $151 billion annually. Without cultivating a mindset that security matters, 
firms are likely to suffer high security costs which could have been avoided. Our post-hoc analysis suggests 
that a high level of security-oriented culture may help reduce security related costs, as less managerial effort 
is needed to promote the implementation of security practices. Relatedly, firms need to be selective because 
the moderation effect of culture may not apply to all security practices. 
Finally, our results show that customer pressure is also affected by government pressure. Demands 
from customers are partially explained by government pressure. Such insights provide a venue for firms to 
better comprehend how customer demands pertaining to SCS emerge. Firms in the same industry are subject 
to similar governmental regulations. Consequently, a firm can be well prepared for customer demands by 
proactively implementing practices that the government stipulates. This proactive strategy may also bring 
collateral benefits as Ritchie and Melnyk (2011) demonstrated in their study on early adopters of the C-TPAT 





Our study is subject to several limitations, which in turn offer opportunities for future research. First, 
a better understanding of how coercive pressures fasten with internal forces to affect security practices is 
necessary to advance the SCS literature. Although this study emphasizes the role of top management 
involvement, future studies might examine other important factors such as a firm’s ownership. Public firms 
and their operations are more visible and thus may be subject to more scrutiny by more constituents. Thus, 
there may be a difference on how they handle SCS practices. Second, because this research is cross-
sectional, it cannot evaluate how the practices supported by the top managers get actually implemented, 
readjusted, or annulled over time. A longitudinal study may be more apposite to address SCS over time.  
  Third, we did not specify relationships between organizational culture and top management 
involvement. Given the cross-sectional research design of our study and considering the long duration it 
takes for culture to evolve when implicit or explicit attempts are made to alter it, we did not articulate any 
hypotheses that relate culture and top management involvement (although we tested a mediation model in 
robustness analysis). However, future studies may acknowledge this relationship. As Bass and Avolio (1993, 
p. 11γ) note “Cultural norms arise and change because of what leaders focus their attention on, how they 
react to crises, the behaviors they role model, and whom they attract to their organization.” Finally, due to 
the topic sensitivity, we were able to collect data of only a few control variables. We encourage future studies 
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Table 1. Description of sample 
Number of Employees Frequency Percent Annual Revenue Frequency Percent 
Less than 100 21 21 Less than 10 million 8 5% 
100 to 499 60 60 10 to 99.9 million 62 37% 
500 to 999 20 20 100 to 999.9 million 38 23% 
1,000 to 9,999 27 27 1 to 10 billion 36 22% 
Over 10,000 38 38 More than 10 billion 22 13% 
Total 166 100% Total 166 100% 
Position Frequency Percent Type of Commerce Frequency Percent 
VP/Sr. VP/President 19 11% Business-to-business (B2B) 90 54% 
CEO/COO 19 11% Business-to-consumer (B2C) 43 26% 
Director 37 23% Both 33 20% 
Managers 81 49%    
Others 10 6%    
Total 166 100% Total 166 100% 
 
Table 2. Means, standard deviations, and correlations of the non-categorical variables  
 Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Firm size (annual sales) 3.00 1.40         
2 Past performance (profit margin, in %) 21.03 17.20 -0.12        
3 Market share (in %) 36.71 29.66 -0.06 0.42**       
4 Government pressure 4.19 1.50 0.19* 0.09 0.08      
5 Customer pressure  4.75 1.49 -0.03 0.16* 0.16* 0.55**     
6 Top management involvement  5.34 1.21 0.01 0.16* 0.18* 0.35** 0.60**    
7 Security-oriented organizational culture 5.13 1.09 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.55** 0.63** 0.73**   
8 SCS practices (2nd order) 4.71 1.48 0.16* 0.12 0.16* 0.40** 0.52** 0.76** 0.80**  
9 Supply chain security performance 4.47 1.27 0.06 0.23** 0.13 0.47** 0.48** 0.59** 0.66** 0.75** 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01 (two-tailed). 
 




Control Variables    
Firm size s SCS practices 0.245 4.005 0.000 
Past Performance s SCS practices 0.110 1.842 0.065 
Market Share s SCS practices  -0.072 -1.232 0.218 
SIC code s SCS practices -0.103 -1. 777 0.076 
Firm size s SCS performance -0.018 -0.265 0.791 
Past Performance s SCS performance -0.052 -0.723 0.470 
Market Share s SCS performance 0.011 0.172 0.863 
SIC code s SCS performance 0.081 1.346 0.178 
Main Effects    
Government Pressure s Customer Pressure 0.757 9.420 0.000 
Government Pressure s Top Mgmt Involvement 0.598 4.421 0.000 
Customer Pressure s Top Mgmt Involvement 0.370 2.480 0.013 
Top Mgmt Involvement s SCS practices  0.409 2.478 0.013 
Security-oriented organizational culture s SCS practices 0.569 3.484 0.000 
Security practices s SCS performance 0.939 28.013 0.000 
Interaction Effect    
Security-oriented organizational culture X Top Mgmt Involvement s SCS 
practices 
0.225 3.416 0.001 
Model Fit: ぬ2=616.071 (465 df), ぬ2/df = 1.324, CFI=.931, TLI=.919, RMSEA=.063, 90% C.I. RMSEA (.048, .075) 





Table 4: Analysis of mediation effects (full mediation)  
Paths Bias corrected bootstrapping 95% CI 
  Lower Higher 
Paths ending at SCS Performance   
Total Effects: Government Pressure s SCS Performance 0.285 0.667 
Specific Indirect Effects   
Government Pressure s Customer Pressure s Top Management involvement s SCS practices s  
SCS Performance 
0.039 0.510 
Government Pressure s Top Management involvement s SCS practices s  SCS Performance 0.040 0.364 
Total Effects: Customer Pressure s SCS Performance 0.195 0.611 
Specific Indirect Effects   
Customer Pressure s Top Management involvement s SCS practices s  SCS Performance 0.195 0.611 
   
Paths ending at SCS practices   
Total Effects: Government Pressure s SCS practices 0.316 0.724 
Specific Indirect Effects:   
Government Pressure s Customer Pressure s Top Management involvement s SCS practices  0.045 0.395 
Government Pressure s Top Management involvement s SCS practices 0.042 0.557 
   
Total Effects: Customer Pressure s SCS practices 0.218 0.663 
Specific Indirect Effects:   










Effect SE t-value p-value LLCI ULCI 
-3.5301 .0081 .1715 .0473 .9623 -.3307 .3469 
-3.2601 .0295 .1607 .1838 .8544 -.2880 .3471 
-2.9901 .0510 .1503 .3392 .7349 -.2460 .3480 
-2.7201 .0724 .1403 .5161 .6065 -.2049 .3497 
-2.4501 .0939 .1309 .7172 .4743 -.1647 .3524 
-2.1801 .1153 .1220 .9448 .3463 -.1258 .3564 
-1.9101 .1367 .1140 1.1995 .2322 -.0885 .3620 
-1.6401 .1582 .1069 1.4793 .1412 -.0531 .3695 
-1.3701 .1796 .1010 1.7779 .0774 -.0200 .3792 
-1.1953 .1935 .0979 1.9759 .0500 .0000 .3870 
-1.1001 .2011 .0965 2.0833 .0389 .0104 .3918 
-.8301 .2225 .0936 2.3778 .0187 .0376 .4074 
-.5601 .2439 .0924 2.6406 .0092 .0614 .4265 
-.2901 .2654 .0930 2.8540 .0049 .0816 .4491 
-.0201 .2868 .0954 3.0077 .0031 .0984 .4752 
.2499 .3083 .0994 3.1019 .0023 .1119 .5046 
.5199 .3297 .1048 3.1445 .0020 .1225 .5369 
.7899 .3511 .1116 3.1475 .0020 .1307 .5716 
1.0599 .3726 .1193 3.1230 .0021 .1368 .6083 
1.3299 .3940 .1279 3.0810 .0025 .1413 .6467 
1.5999 .4155 .1372 3.0290 .0029 .1444 .6865 
1.8699 .4369 .1470 2.9724 .0034 .1465 .7273 
a Controlled for firm size (annual sales), past performance (profit margin), market share, SIC code. 
Culture value is centered; the highest t-value is in bold. 
Model summary: R-square=0.466, MSE=0.875, F=18.72 (df1=7, df2=150), p=0.000.  
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Deployment of Supply Chain Security Practices: Antecedents and Consequences 
Online Appendix A. Description of SCS Practices 
Materially, the organization needs to engage in practices to help it detect whether security breaches are about to occur and study 
events and vulnerabilities via diagnostic practices to anticipate where and when breaches may occur. Speier et al. (2011) define 
detection as the supply chain’s ability to recognize an incident. They note that it is vital that a threat is detected before it materializes 
as a security breach. Sheffi (2005, p. 155) defines detection as the process of distinguishing a true problem from the sometimes 
considerable variations of normal day-to-day business. Firms may deploy technology (Williams et al., 2008) to identify threats and 
monitoring processes to detect deviations and near misses. While it is important to protect the supply chain and detect potential 
threats, it is also equally vital to conduct in depth analysis of SCS breaches and examine processes across supply chain tiers to 
identify vulnerabilities (i.e., diagnostics). 
 
To avert breaches from materializing, the organization can adopt protective practices to secure the physical supply chain (e.g., 
carriers, facilities) and minimize risk by apposite supplier selection practices that weigh in supply chain security considerations. 
Given that current supply chains involve numerous suppliers across tiers and given that a breach of security at any node or link 
can be disastrous, identifying potential suppliers that exhibit strong security capabilities is vital. The supply chain is as strong as 
the weakest partner. As Speier et al. (β011) note, “Supply chain partners’ capabilities need to be verified from a security standpoint 
as partners who lack sufficient security capabilities might be replaced” (p. 7β6). In addition, as the overall level of supply disruption 
risk increases, buyers are more likely to select alternative suppliers who may be more capable of protecting the products throughout 
the supply chain hand-offs (Ellis et al., 2010).  
 
To mitigate risk, organizations invest in contingency planning practices that prepare the organization to cope with a breach once it 
emerges. This reflects practices that enable the organization to respond to a breach that has already occurred (Williams et al., 
2008). Organizations need well defined plans to react to a crisis and definitive plans which spell out what to do. To assure that the 
organization is able to cope with emerging threats, there is a need for an element of continuous improvement practices. New 
threats demand that the organizational SCS strategy and responses are current and commensurate with the magnitude of the risk 
the organization may encounter in the near and distant future. It is essential that any program has an embedded element of 
unceasing development. Williams et al. (2008) note that SCS practices need to be monitored and maintained and warn that failure 
to do so can be disastrous. As threats change in form and intensity so does the organization needs to reconsider its practices, 
tools and practices. Training employees for security and risk management when assuming new roles, monitoring whether practices 
and objectives are met, updating the SCS strategy, and implementing corrective procedures when lapses are observed is critical. 
 
Online Appendix B. Measurement Model Methods  
 
We first wanted to assess whether a second-order specification can describe relationships between our SCS practices. Towards 
this task alternative measurement model configurations were tested (Koufteros et al., 2009). The results demonstrate that our 
higher-order specification can be empirically supported. Specifically, the fit indices produced by the second-order model 
specification are fairly similar to the fit indices of an all first-order correlated variable specification (the fit indices for these two 
models were vastly superior vis-a-vis the fit indices of other competing models). Statistically, the model fit did not differ across the 
two specifications (ぬ2diff=13.54, 9 df, p>0.14) but the second-order model specification offers clear advantages as SCS practices 
typically emanate from a specific system or program and work in concert. Therefore, SCS practices are represented in the structural 
model via a full aggregation specification (see online Appendix C). 
 
Using raw data as input, we stipulated two measurement models via Mplus 7.2; one measurement model included the two forms 
of coercive institutional forces, top management involvement, and organizational culture. The second measurement model included 
SCS practices and SCS performance. The two separate models were necessary in order to avert identification problems if a 
singular model was specified. Given the size of the model and our sample size we would not have enough degrees of freedom to 
obtain a reliable solution. We mitigate concerns regarding discriminant validity by testing for it for all possible pairs across 
measurement models. Each measurement model was examined using multiple model fit indices (i.e., ぬ2/df, CFI, TLI, SRMR, and 
RMSEA) to assess congruence between the data and our respective measurement model. To evaluate convergent validity, we 
probed the size of item-factor loadings (and respective t-values) (Kline, 1998). We evaluated discriminant validity using the ぬ2 
difference test (Bagozzi and Phillips, 1982) for all pairs of latent variables across measurement models. Construct reliability was 
appraised through composite reliability (CR) and average variance extracted (AVE). 
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factors and one 
second-order factor 
ぬ2(df) 652.69(350) 1269.40(350) 547.48(335) 561.02(344) 
ぬ2/df 1.86 3.63 1.63 1.63 
CFI 0.87 0.60 0.91 0.91 
TFI 0.86 0.57 0.90 0.90 
RMSEA 0.10 0.18 0.07 0.08 
SRMR 0.06 0.52 0.05 0.05 
    
    
Second-order factor: SCS Practices Std.  loading Std. error t-value 
Continuous improvement practices 0.99 0.01 97.28 
Contingency planning 0.98 0.01 79.56 
Protective practices 0.98 0.04 28.07 
Supplier selection 0.87 0.03 28.83 
Detection practices 1.00 0.01 103.13 
Diagnostic practices 0.99 0.01 114.31 
 
 
Online Appendix D. Summary of Discriminant Validity Testing (ね2 difference values)  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Government pressure           
2. Customer pressure 12.44          
3. Top management 
    involvement 
23.10 43.05         
4. Security-oriented culture 50.25 36.65 85.31        
5. Continuous improvement 35.48 12.82 64.20 70.86       
6. Contingency planning 41.99 15.78 66.94 84.15 153.24      
7. Protective practices 33.68 17.05 48.33 59.06 94.74 96.83     
8. Supplier selection 30.99 13.54 36.42 60.48 97.03 73.49 67.52    
9. Detection practices 30.76 25.91 59.47 75.41 136.04 138.64 106.54 90.33   
10. Diagnostic practices 44.64 14.77 54.43 84.11 156.31 145.74 90.90 98.19 159.35  





Online Appendix E. Measurement scales  
 
Factor and scale items Std.  loading S.E. t-value 
Government pressure: CR=0.87, AVE=0.69     
There is definite pressure from our government to meet security standards .899 .038 23.59 
We will receive significant benefits if we adopt security standards prescribed by our government .710 .089 7.98 
Our government takes an active role on security matters .869 .040 21.62 
Customer pressure: CR=0.84, AVE=0.66     
Our customers pressure us to do better on security .655 .076 8.64 
We have to meet standards for security as our customers are demanding us to do so .861 .044 19.64 
Our customers hold us accountable for security .894 .037 24.08 
Top management involvement: CR=0.88, AVE=0.61    
Our top management has assumed a leadership role in risk management .850 .038 22.39 
Our top management allocates proper levels of resources to enhance the security of our supply chain .657 .067 9.78 
Our top management provides clear objectives for securing the supply chain .817 .043 19.51 
Top management has an active oversight over supply chain risk management .847 .038 22.08 
Top management is aware of the risks and consequences associated with supply chain disruptions .702 .061 11.43 
Security-oriented organizational culture: CR=0.87, AVE=0.57    
Putting supply chain security first is a sentiment widely shared within the organization .822 .042 19.43 
We believe that supply chain security is the responsibility of everyone in the organization .634 .071 8.93 
We believe that supply chain security concerns should be viewed with respect .808 .044 18.57 
We believe that there are considerable security threats that can impact us .759 .052 14.61 
We believe that even minor security breaches in our supply chain will be devastating to our company .752 .053 14.23 
Measurement Model fit: ぬ2(98)=139.41, ぬ2/df=1.42, CFI=0.95, TLI=0.93, SRMR=0.06 and RMSEA=0.07    
Continuous improvement practices: CR=0.92, AVE=0.73    
All of our employees are trained for security and risk management whenever they assume new roles .763 .047 16.27 
We monitor whether the organization’s SCS strategy and objectives are met .889 .025 35.89 
We update or reassess the supply chain security strategy as conditions change .895 .023 38.78 
We have corrective procedures when security lapses are detected  .873 .028 31.24 
Contingency planning: CR=0.88, AVE=0.65    
We know what to do when we encounter supply chain security breaches or crises .862 .030 29.18 
We have a well-defined contingency plan to react to serious supply chain security breaches .916 .020 46.35 
We spell out what to do in the event of a security breach or crisis .853 .031 27.09 
Someone follows up when we raise a serious concern or identify a problem .554 .079 7.04 
Protective practices: CR=0.76, AVE=0.51    
We require comprehensive security capabilities from carriers  .755 .059 12.86 
We secure containers at our facilities to assure they are not compromised  .661 .067 9.91 
We authenticate the identity of visitors in our facilities  .726 .077 9.43 
Supplier selection: CR=0.94, AVE=0.83    
Supplier security is an important criterion when selecting our suppliers  .967 .012 82.16 
We only approve suppliers (irrespective of tier) that have a risk management program in place  .808 .041 19.50 
When selecting suppliers we weigh in whether the supplier has a secure supply chain  .955 .013 73.13 
Detection practices: CR=0.89, AVE=0.52    
We use active measures such as video and sensors to be able to detect security breaches .687 .059 11.63 
We use sophisticated technologies to detect if containers have been compromised .734 .052 14.16 
We use RFID or other similar technology for tracking purposes throughout our supply chain  .714 .083 8.60 
We verify that all shipments are legitimate  .575 .075 7.71 
We make use of anti tampering technologies on containers  .570 .075 7.58 
We monitor the loading/unloading process of cargo to identify potential security breaches  .793 .042 18.84 
We have procedures to detect supply chain security failures or near failures .741 .052 14.37 
We have procedures to detect near misses in supply chain security .883 .026 32.27 
Diagnostic practices: CR=0.93, AVE=0.70    
We regularly assess supplier security performance against security standards  .836 .035 23.74 
We do conduct in-depth analysis of supply chain security breaches  .853 .031 27.10 
We do conduct periodic assessments of our supply chain security  .883 .026 34.10 
We maintain an incident data base of supply chain security breaches  .824 .037 22.19 
We examine all tiers in our supply chain to identify potential security vulnerabilities  .867 .028 30.86 
We conduct unannounced security assessments of our logistics systems  .761 .048 15.95 
SCS performance: (in last three years, our firm has experienced) : CR=0.88, AVE=0.52    
A reduction/less potential for theft/loss .603 .076 7.93 
An improved capability to detect counterfeit parts/products .750 .083 9.04 
A lower probability that our supply chain will be compromised .889 .032 27.70 
A lower probability of cargo misuse .681 .065 10.51 
Lower levels of supply chain vulnerability .646 .069 9.37 
An improvement in security .812 .043 18.91 
A reduction/less potential for smuggling of drugs .633 .075 8.44 






Online Appendix F. Common Methods Bias  
We addressed common method bias (CMB) through both procedural and statistical approaches (Craighead et al., 2011). We used 
the following procedural remedies: we assured respondent anonymity, scrambled measurement items for the theoretical constructs, 
reduced item ambiguity via interviews and a pilot study, and included several marker variables in the survey. Next, we used 
statistical approaches to assess CMB. We first fitted a model with all measurement items loaded on a common-method factor (i.e., 
Harman’s single factor) via a CFA approach. If CMB exists, a latent variable will account for all indicators (Podsakoff et al. 2003). 
The fit indices failed to support a single factor: ぬ2 (1224) =2452.39, ぬ2/df=2.00, CFI=0.71, TLI=0.69, SRMR=0.08, and RMSEA=0.11.  
 
We also used a marker variable technique by deploying three indicators which are theoretically unrelated to the variables of interest 
(Malhotra et al., 2006; Craighead et al., 2011). The correlations of marker variables with the variables of interest in the structural 
model were low and statistically non-significant. For example, the marker indicators and their correlations with government pressure 
were: (1) Our customers require us to play soccer (r=0.094), (2) We eat dinner at a restaurant on an everyday basis (r=0.092), and 
(3) We only hire employees who support the San Antonio Spurs (r=-0.024). We also correlated the marker variables with SCS 
performance and the correlations were (1) r=0.033, (2) r=0.050, (3) r=-0.069 respectively. The low correlations suggest that CMB 
is not a worrying concern.  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
